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 In 1972, Whitney Azoy was a young American diplomat in Afghanistan.  He had chosen 
to be stationed at that embassy because of Afghanistan's "wild and woolly" reputation, but was 
disappointed to find instead the usual tame round of diplomatic protocol and politesse.  Luckily, 
a new Afghan friend told him how to get beneath the professional veneer.  "If you want to know 
what we're really like, go to a buzkashi game".   
 Azoy followed his friend's advice. Inspired by the experience, he soon left his diplomatic 
post to pursue training in anthropology and the ethnographic study of buzkashi.  One wonders 
what his family thought about his career change, but readers ought to be grateful for his choice, 
since a decade later he produced the excellent book I have the pleasure of reviewing here.  It is a 
testament to the spirit and culture of the Afghan people as well as a sad reminder of how much 
has been lost in that war-ravaged land.  Even more importantly, this book shows precisely how 
intelligent analysis of a "game" can be a key for understanding a whole social universe.  In the 
pages below, I will outline some of the major points made, but I cannot do justice either to the 
depth nor the feeling of the original.  If you can find it, read it. 
 Most people who have witnessed buzkashi would agree that it is the most exciting game 
in the world. It has long been an obsession of the Afghans, particularly of the Uzbeks and 
Turkmans of the North, who are famous for their horsemanship and who have always been the 
greatest players.  The term buzkashi literally means "goat-dragging", though goats have nothing 
to do with the actual play.  Rather, riders compete to lift the headless, hoofless carcass of a calf 
from the ground, wrest it from their rivals, and carry it away to be dropped uncontested.   
 Buzkashi takes two forms: the local and traditional game is called tudabarai - literally, 
emerging from a mass.  The winner of each round is the man who yanks the calf free and clear 
from the melee of competitors and rides off with it.  The calf is then thrown down triumphantly, 
and the free-for-all resumes.  Play can involve more than a thousand men, though the best are the 
wool helmeted specialists called chapandazan who ride the fiery horses supplied by their patrons 
(khans).  
 In tudabarai there are no boundaries to the field of play, and the mass of riders range 
across the plain; nor is there any cumulative scoring. Each round is complete in itself, ending as 
the winner is awarded prizes and praise by the town crier, who also lavishes accolades on the 
proud owner of the victorious horse. Though the rules of tudabarai are simple in the extreme, 
controversy over who has won each victory is endemic since, as the Afghans say, "the calf has 
four legs" and more than one chapandaz can grab hold and claim control.  The referee (the tooi-
bashi) who must decide the victor is a friend of the match's sponsor (the tooi-wala), and he must 
often bend his rulings in recognition of the political power of the various khan patrons whose 
chapandazan are competing.  
 The second, "official" form is a recent innovation that is far more bureaucratized and 
rationalized. Called qarajai, it takes its name from the "black place" of the demarcated arena 
where it is played. Qarajai is a contest between two equal and uniformed teams, numbering no 
more than fifteen men on a side.  The goal is to drop the calf carcass into the "scoring circle" of 
the other team after carrying it around a flag at the far end of the playing field.  Points are given 
for getting past the flag and for putting the calf in the circle.  After each sequence, the carcass is 
returned to the starting point.  Scoring is cumulative, and teams, not individuals, are the eventual 
winners of a formal round robin tournament.  The games are are refereed by official umpires and 
sponsored by the state. In principle, there is no appealing the referee's rulings, and the prizes are 
given by state sponsors to the winning chapandazan, not to their khan patrons, who are relegated 
to a very secondary position indeed.  The purpose of this sport is both to demonstrate state 
power, and to assimilate the prestige of buzkashi to the nationalist enterprize. 
 Clearly, the latter rationalized form is both an indicator and consequence of the central 
state's effort to exercise increased control over the turbulent competition of tudabarai buzkashi. 
As Norbert Elias has argued convincingly, the bureaucratization and sanitization of chaotic play 
is a normal part of what he has called the "civilizing process".  But in Afghanistan, the pathway 
from an unruly and highly individualistic game to a rationalized and state regulated team sport 
was not smooth. As Azoy shows through detailed case studies, the efforts of state officials to 
control buzkashi play and thereby demonstrate their own absolute power sometimes backfired, 
arousing angry reactions among spectators and players, who might simply stop playing in 
protest. Such challenges to governmental authority had to be quickly dealt with and hushed up, 
since they revealed the very real weaknesses of the appointed authorities.   
 If state-sponsored qarajai buzkashi was an effort to domesticate the tribes and legitimate 
the government, local-level tudabarai buzkashi was a microcosmic enactment of the antagonistic 
structural principles that motivate Afghan men; it can rightly be seen as symbolic warfare, a 
direct expression of the deep tensions of a segmentary tribal society. Yet, buzkashi also served to 
contain the social potential for violence, since within its framework competition was defined as 
"not serious" and anger was curbed on the grounds that everyone was just "having fun". In play, 
conflict between men was both expressed and kept in check, since for participants buzkashi is, 
by definition, "only a game" and not worth warring over.   
 Azoy shows in detail how buzkashi in the traditional local setting served to bring people 
together in co-operative groups, and also to defuse tensions in the rivalrous Afghan environment. 
At the same time, the game provided an important nexus of the continual real-life struggle for 
status and authority among Afghan local elites who lived within an environment where power 
was precarious and where institutional structures were notoriously fragile.  In this social world, it 
was not enough to have wealth or a great family name to lead one's fellows; a man was 
recognized as superior primarily because other men respected him for his personal abilities and 
achievements.  
 In this context, tudabarai buzkashi was not so much about the magnificent horsemanship 
of the chapandazan (who were rarely men of any political importance) as it was about the ability 
of the game's local organizer - the tooi-wala - to show his own skills as a manager of men, his 
ability to marshall a wide range of social connections, his capacity to mediate disputes and foster 
co-operation among rivals, and his wealth and lavish hospitality.  All of these were crucial 
attributes for anyone seeking to gain a great reputation. Thus, in traditional society ambitious 
khans with the wealth, following, and connections would inevitably attempt to organize a 
buzkashi match during the winter season.  If the attempt came off well, the tooi-wala's status 
would be greatly enhanced.  If it did not, his honor would be badly tarnished. 
 Through two case studies - one of a successful buzkahsi match, the other of a failure - 
Azoy reveals in striking detail the actual preparations and risks involved in undertaking this 
massive venture, all done in the name of "fun".  Resembling very much the preparations for 
potlatch festivities in the Northwest coast of America, or the gigantic exchanges of pigs in 
highland New Guinea, the organization of a buzkashi match required the tooi-wala to line up 
willing hosts and helpers, invite hundreds of guests, and accumulate food for feasting and 
valuables and money to offer as prizes.  At every stage the reputation of the tooi-wala was on the 
line.  If he could not muster enough supporters to act as hosts, he would be dishonored; if the 
guests did not show up, he would be dishonored; if the food, lodgings and prizes were 
insufficient, he would be dishonored. The most devastating dishonor occurred if disputes among 
the players disrupted the game. Yet the organizer could show no anxiety.  Once the three days of 
games began, his duty as a khan was to appear at ease and graciously entertain his guests.  He 
left the dirty task of adjudicating disputes to his lieutenant, the tooi-bashi, who had to be a man 
of great political tact and practical wisdom, with subtle skills as a negotiator. 
 In traditional society, success at the delicate, expensive and complex business of 
arranging and overseeing a buzkashi match was a realistic measure of a man's capacity for 
greatness. Failure did not mean a total loss of position, but it did mean the organizer would never 
be more than mediocrity who could not command the praise or loyalty of his fellows.  As Azoy 
shows, the melee of the tudabarai, exciting as it was, was less exciting than the complicated real 
life game of status competition that went on beneath it. Most importantly, buzkashi provided the 
khans with a way to display their talents and gain honor while not actually killing one another. 
 All that was challenged when the central government attempted to assert its control over 
buzkashi, turning it from a game among khans to an official function, monitored by state 
appointed authorities.  But although the regime sought to maintain its legitimacy by co-opting 
and bureaucratizing buzkashi, its efforts, like its efforts at state-building, were ultimately 
unsuccessful.  When the national organizers of qarajai buzkashi were swept away in the 
Communist coup of 1978, one of Azoy's informants told him that "the buzkashi is about to 
begin". He was right, but it was now a buzkashi played with bullets, not with horses.   
 Azoy's book was published in 1982.  It ends with a lament by an old chapandaz who had 
gained glory playing buzkashi.  As he says: "I feel old and alone, but what can I do?  All my life 
I have played.  How can I stop?" (pl 143)  Now, nearly twenty years later, in the age of the 
taliban, such men may no longer exist. Certainly, the spirit of buzkashi has been greatly altered 
by the catastrophe of Afghanistan's recent past.  Both a sophisticated analysis and a fond tribute, 
Azoy's little book does justice to this great game, and to the men who played it. 
 
 
     Charles Lindholm 
